## (E) WARR TIVE (Cont d)

- 1045 Sighted two 2-masted topsail schooners (SC #1) proceeding north in company in SINGKLWANG BAY, Closed to investigate. The size (about 75 tons) of these schooners and the type and quality of their rigging put them in a category above native craft. After considering the orders which specifically forbid the promiscuous sinking of N.E.I. native craft, decided that the cargo carrying capacities of these schooners warranted their being sunk, This decision was made after inspecting them with . a 16 power long glass at less than 5,000 yards.
- Manned 5 inch deck gun and opened fire. (See Gun 1155 Attack #1).

L-t3 N 1-00 N Tosit: 1200 Long. 108-53 E

1222 1226 Both schooners sunk. Each schooner required about 5 hits to be sunk, but it took a total of 83 rounds for us to obtain results.

1227 Moved out to 10 fathom line at 4 engine speed.

Sighted Privateer. 1258

1428 Submerged to work water out of hydraulic system.

1700 Surfaced.

Headed north to patrol vicinity to west of SOUTH 1800 N TUN. ISLANDS.

#### 12 June

Tatrolling to westward of SOUTH N.TUNL ISLANDS. 0000 Dived for submerged patrol of approach to SERLSLN 0635

TASSAGE. Sighted Privateer. 1130

2-24 N Lat. Tosit: 1200 Long. 108-55 E

Headed south to patrol SE of ST. TIERRE 2051 Surfaced. Island.

### 13 June

Tatrolling SE of ST. TIERRE Island. 0000 Headed south to patrol off RAJA TOINT.

0849 01-15 N Lat. Tosit: 1200 Long. 108-42 E

SD contact at 14 miles. 1803 Sighted "BETTY" (AC #11). Two more SD contacts. 1805 Tlane seemed to suspect that we were not another sailboat (there was one a mile or two from us at

the time). sighted two more "BETTY'S" (AC #12) and (AC #13). 1809 Dived.

#### (B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

1838 Surfaced.

Headed north for valuity of ST. PIERRE Island. 1943

#### .14 June

Patrolling SE of ST. PIERFE Island. 0000

Posit: 1200 Lat. 1-45 N Long. 108-45 E

#### 15 June

0000 Patrolling SE of ST. PIERRE Island.

0735 Headed south to pat: 1 off coast between RAJA RFOINT and BU ONG ISLANTS.

SD contact at 17 miles. Sighted "BLTTY" (AC #14). **3**838

Lat. 1200 Posit: 1-08 N Long. 108-43 E

Sighted Privateer. SD contact at 18 miles. 1332 Received report via VHF that he and sighted nothing of interest.

1652 SD conact at 12 miles.

1653 Sighted plane, thought to be "TOPSY" (AC #15). Though he would pass fairly close, his altitude was at least 8,000 feet, so decided to try to wait him out. However, when SD lost him at less than three miles, he commenced to maneuver. Dived.

1743 Surfaced.

SD contact at 13 miles. Sighted "BETTY" (AC #16).

SD contact at 14 miles. Sighted 2nd "BETTY" (AC #17).

SD contact at 12 miles. Sighted 3rd "BETTY" (AC #18). 1754 1755

1806

Sent message to CTG 71 reporting regularity with 2340 which we had sighted Jap planes passing over the same place on the BORNEO coast. We believe that this information may be of value to our air command.

#### 16 June

0000 Patrolling to northward of BURONG Islands.

0015 Detected SJ radar interference. Challenged.

Received reply to challenge and exchanged calls 0100 with south bound KRAKEN.

0135 Received mess ge from CTF 71 directing us to commence return to FREMANTLE upon receipt of message. Further ordered to patrol 4 days in JAVA SEA along south coast of BORNEO.

1200 Lat. 0-25 S Posit: Long 107-57 E

Sighted U.S. submarine on quarter. 1841

1850 Exchanged calls with KRAKEN via SJ radar.

#### NARRATIVE (Cont'd) (B)

Commenced transit of KARIMATA STRAIT. 2114

#### 17 June

Transitting KARIMATA STRAIT. 0000

Detected SJ radar interference ahead. Challenged. 0003

Exchanged resognition signals and calls with 0011 north bound CHUB.

0530 Cleaned KIRIMATA STRATT and headed east in JAVA SEA.

4-05 S 1200 Posit: Lat. Long. 110-08 E

1609 Made trim dive.

1930 Headed NE to close the coast in vicinity of TG POETING.

#### 18 June

Patrolling to eastward approximately along the 10 0000 fathom line south of TC FOETING.

Headed to seaward in order to be divable waters 0445 during daylight,

Lat. 04-22 S · 1200 Posit: Long. 113-05 E

2105 Headed ME to close coast in vicinity of CAPE SELLTIN.

#### 19 June

Patrolling to the eastward along 10 fathom 0000 line wouth of C.PE SEL T.N.

Headed toward vicinity west of LAUROT ISLANDS to 0315 patrol in divable water during daylight.

SD contacts at 18 and 23 miles. Sighted 2 Liberators. 1104 Very sketchy communications established via VHF.

04-42 S Lat. 1200 Posit: 115-06 E Long.

Commenced closing the coast-to patrol along 10 2000 fathom line east of C. PE SELITIN.

#### 20 June

Patrolling along 10 fathom line east of CAPE 0000 SELLTIN.

Headed to seaward in order to patrol in divable 0400 waters west of LIUROT ISLINDS during daylight.

4-48 S 1200 Posit: Lat.

Long. 114-48 E

Departed area enroute LOMBOK STR/IT. 2030

001	א הדרד ידי הדדא		II G G G TEEAST	WAR TO THE TOTAL TO	
	NFIDEN	,	U.S.S. CAIMAN	WAR PATROL N	O. THREE
(B	) NAR	RATIVE (Cent'd			
21	June				
	0000		STRAIT.  Iat. 6  Long. 116		
	2012 2255		MBOK STRAIT went	t to 4 engine	speed.
	2258 2345		from Northbound	d HARDHEAD.	
22	June				
	0000	South of LOMBO Posit:	K STRATT enroute		
	2030	Sent message t	o CTF 71 giving		•
23	June				
		Enroute FREMAN Posit:	TLE. Lat. 1: Long. 11	5-13 S 4-41 E	
24	June				
	0000 0007	Enroute FREMAN. Exchanged recognitions	PII. gnition signals	with Northbour	nd
		Sighted Northborosit;	ound BLUEBACK. Lat. 19 Long. 11		
		## [1일] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2	ound HAMMERHEAD, gnition signals		nd
25	June				
		Enroute FREMAN Sent message to FREMANTLE.	TLE. o CTF 71 giving	revised ETA	
	1200	Posit:	Lat, 22 Long, 112		
26	June				
	0000	Enroute FREMAN Posit:	22 BM [F] [20] [1 [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2]	orthbound CAVAI 8-47 S 2-37 E	LIA.

: + "

U.S. CAIMAN WOR TETROL NO. THE

## (B) NARRATIVE (Cont'd)

. 1355 Sighted H.N.M.S. 0-19.
2210 Received message from CTF 71 to proceed into harbor unescorted.

#### 27 June

CONSTRUCTAL

0000 Enroute FREMANTLE.
0449 Sighted ROTTNEST LIGHT.
Remained out to sea until daylight.

1239 Moored in berth 5 Fremantle Harbor, Fremantle, Western Australia.

## CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. CAIMAN

WAR PATROL NO. THREE

# (C) WEATHER

No remarks.

# (D) TIDAL INFORMATION

No remarks.

# (E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No remarks.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS
Time Lat.

	Time	Lat.		Initial	Est Cours	eHow	
No.	.Date	Long.	Туре	Range	Speed	Cont. F	lemarks
	0126	12-54N			170T	Lights	See
1.	25 May	109-30E	AH	28000 yds	14 kts	Sighted	(M' RADAR
	1045	1-00N	2		T000	High	<del></del>
2.	11 June	108-54E	Schooners	s 12000 yds	4 kts	Peris.	Sunk

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS								
Time	Lat.		Initial	Conrae	How	Remarks		
No.Date	Long,	Type	Range	Speed 0700T	Conti	Rec'd		
1933	11-53N	T - 1	16000 yds	120 ktg	Sight	4 Bombs		
1.9 May	109-27世	Jake	4 to 5	IZO ROS	DIGIIO			
0735	TT-2217	N Take	miles		Peris.			
2.16 May	11-21.5	N	milion					
0724 3.19 May		5E Jake	10 miles		Sight	Dived		
1224	11-47.5	N						
4.23 May	/-	Jake	10 miles		Peris.			
2008	11-50N		<b>5</b> • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		Peris.			
5.23 May		Jake	5 miles		16112.	Sighted		
1800	01-33N	Tollow	210 miles		SD	One		
6.8 June		val(:)	14. III.10B					
0745	109~4.7国	Betty	21 miles		SD	Sighted		
0.750	() 1 4 IN					Sighted		
8.10 June	108-47E	Betty	22 miles		SD	Dived		
1334	01 - 50N				SD	Sighted		
9.10 June	108-51E	Betty	15 miles		SD	219110 0		
0741	01・- 33 + 5	N Potty	11 miles		SD	Sighted		
10.11 June	01-19N	Decoy	II MILLOD					
11.13 June	108-71	Betty	14 miles	-	SD	Sighted		
1803	07 916					oichtod		
12.13 June	e 10861E	Betty	14 miles		SD	Sighted Sighted		
1303	01-191				SD	Dived		
13.13 June	e 103-611	E Betty	14 miles		מט	<i>D.e.</i> 7 0 d		
0838	01 101	7 Do++17	17 miles		SD	Sighted		
14.15 Jun	e 108-491	Berry	17 miles					
1652 Tun	01-05N	E Tonsey	13 miles		SD	Sighted		
7751	() [ () () [ ]					C - 1 + 0 A		
16.15 Jun	e 108-39	E Betty	13 miles		SD	Sighted		
1801.	(100,000				3D	Sighted		
17.15 Jun	e 108-39	E Betty	14 miles		:SD	D.L.B.1100		
7006	01-00N				SD	Sighted		
18.15 Jun	e 108-39	E Betty	12 miles					

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. CAIMAN

WAR PATROL NO. THREE

(H) ATTACK DATA

Time: 1155

GUN ATTACK NO, ONE
Date: 11 June 1945 Lat: 1-00N; Long: 108-54E

Sunk

Target data - Damage inflicted
2 two-masted topsail schooners, estimated 75 tons
each.

Damage Determined by Both observed to sink.

Details of Action

Gun used:

Rounds fired: Type Ammunition:

Effectiveness of Fire:

Average Range:

Fire Control used:

Erratic Performance:

5"/25 Cal. deck gun 83

83 H.C.

Fair; very high percentage of close

misses.

4500 yds for 38 rounds. 2800 yds for 45 rounds.

Radar ranges; TDC as range keeper;

Periscope Spotting.

1 misfire; unloaded through breech.

#### (I) MINES

Two spherical horned mines were sunk NW of CAPE PADARAN on 15 May 1945. Neither mine exploded in spite of several 20mm hits.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No remarks.

- (K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
- (1) Engineering (General Motors 16-278A Main Engines)

Injector filters of the sintered bronze type again caused trouble due to deterioration and carrying away of the filter material. The three times that the filters caused trouble is considered an overall major defect as each time an engine was put out of commission.

### (2) Torpedoes

(a) On first routine battery charge torpedo number 54007 (Mk 18-1) was found to have one low cell and zero ground reading. The ground was traced to the starting switch and was found to be caused by a small piece of copper wire lodged between the contact and the frame of the switch. The ground was cleared by removing the piece of wire. Attempt was made to bring the low cell up by charging, but the maximum specific gravity attainable was 1.220. The cell was discharged and jumped out.

On the second routine battery charge torpedoes number 57447 (Mk 18-2) and 57180 (Mk 18-1) in tubes 2 and 5 respectively were found to have been slightly damaged by undetected battery explosions. The extent of the damage was: several badly burned and a few cracked cell caps in each, one cracked cell top in torpedo number 57180, burned hydrogen burner cable in both, slightly burned main cables in both. The damaged cell caps were replaced, the burned part of the hydrogen burner cable was repaired by splicing in a new section of cable, and the charred portions of the main cables were scraped down to good insulation and painted with glyptol. The cracked cell top was cracked in such a way that no repairs could be made, and since further trouble was unlikely nothing was done to this The cause of the explosion was determined to be cell. improperly insulated connections between the cable from the torpedo and the cable from the hydrogen burner panel.

## (K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)

A short circuit at this joint shunted part of the current from the burner bringing the temperature too low for combustion of hydrogen. Subsequent breaking of the short circuit allowed the temperature of the burner to rise back to normal after an explosive quantity of hydrogen had accumulated.

In order to reduce the chances of similar ... casualties in the future it is recommended that two improvements in electrical terpedo hydrogen burning equipment be made, One is universal use of screened type hydrogen burners now being supplied by some activities; the other is a satisfactory method of connecting the burner cable from the torpedo to the burner panel. The second item could be accomplished by installing small plugs on the torpedo cable with mating connections in a protecting junc on box.

### (3) Main Lydraulic Plant

The bow plane rigging control unit developed a leak-by which by-passed oil from supply to return side. Emergency solution consisted of closing the supply to this unit at the manifold, opening it only when diving.

### (L) RADIO

No major casualties to radio equipment were sustained. Serials were missed only because of atmespheric conditions and faulty transmission from Subic.

It appears that Subic does not repeat all serials the following night, All of our missing serials apparently

were transmitted only during daylight,

When lifeguard services are provided, the establishment of communications prior, or immediately after "Bombs Away" would be of mutual benefit to both submarines and aircraft. On one occasion we heard the planes talking among themselves prior to T.O.T., yet attempts on our part to establish communications failed. This group of planes reported the CAIMAN as a destroyer or large patrol boat. If communications are established it is possible to ascertain if all planes . are safely on the way home so that regular patrolling be resumed with a minimum of wasted time.

### (M) RADAR

All radar equipment functioned satisfactorily except for various minor derangments easily repaired by ship's force.

As happened during the second war patrol the SD preamplifier power transformer burned out necessitating the by passing of the unit. SD ranges in excess of 20 miles were obtained both with and without the preamplifier unit.

Off CAPE VARELLA on the night of 24-25 May 1945, the SJ-1 radar tracked a hospital ship to the remarkable range of 110,000 yards. After normal performance the pip disappeared at 33,000 yards and then reappeared at 36,000 yards. Lobing bearings were easily obtained from 36,000 yards to 110,000 yards. No unusual performance was noticed in returns from mountain peaks at this time.

### (N) STUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

No remarks.

#### (O) DENSITY LAYERS

No remarks.

### (P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

Food was excellent. Provisions from the United States, particularly meat and poultry are especially appreciated after a long period of Australian supplies.

Habitability, though excellent for the first phase of the patrol, deteriorated during the second phase. The air conditioning plant was not able to cope with higher air and injection temperatures. The result was a cropping out of heat rash and tropical itch, particularly among personnel stationed in the forward torpedo and control rooms. These ailments, uncomfortable to the extreme, became a menace to the general health of the crew This problem can be solved by the installation of a booster blower in the forward hull ventilation supply line, combined with an additional air conditioning unit similar to the alteration already accomplished in various other boats of this class.

### (Q) PERSONNEL

	(a)	Number	of	men	on board	dur	ing pat	trol	78
	(b)	Number	of	men	qualified	l at	start	of patroi	
(	(c)	Number	of	men	qualified	l at	end of	f patrol	70
(	(d)	Number	of	unqu	alified n	nen	making	their	
		first p	ati	col			-		9
(	(e)	Number	of	men	advanced	in	rating	during	
		patrol							6

The performance of personnel was highly satisfactory.

#### (R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Base to	area	760	miles	- 11,700	gallons
In area		13,259		143,830	
Area to	base	1,870		23,350	

#### (S) DURATION

Days	enroute	to	area	4
Days	in area			50
Days	enroute	to	base	8
Days	submerge	be		18

## (T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes all. Fuel 8,000 gals. Provisions 20 days. Personnel Factor Indeterminate. Limiting factor for this patrol: Orders of Task Force Commander and fuel.

### (U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

No remarks.

## (V) REMARKS

Directives (a) and (b) of ComSub7thFlt Conf. Ltr. FE24-71/L13-1, Serial 0243 of 2 February 1945, were complied with. Lieut (jg) J.V. PETERSON, U.S.N.R., was appointed Security Officer. Through oversight this information was omitted from the report of 2nd War Patrol. Both directives were complied with on that

8 03905

#### SUBLARING SOUAPRON THIRTY

FC5-30/A16-3

Serial: 097

Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, 29 June 1945.

#### C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323) Report of Third War Patrol.

From:

The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY.

To:

The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via:

(1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.

(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:

U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323) - Report of Third War Patrol.

- 1. The Third War Patrol of the CAIMAN under the command of Lieutenant Commander W.L. FEY, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in two phases. First phase was conducted off the South Coast of Indo China and the second phase was conducted off the West Coast of Borneo and in the Java Sea. Patrol was of 62 days duration of which 50 days were spent in the assigned areas. Life guard services were conducted at various times during this patrol but no rescues were made.
- Area coverage was excellent, however there were no contacts worthy of torpedo fire. One contact was made with a properly marked hospital ship. On eleven June two, two-masted schooners were sunk by gunfire in SINGKAWANG BAY. These schooners were undoubtedly carrying enemy supplies due to their size and quality of their rigging.
- 3. The CAIMAN returned from patrol in good material condition and it is expected that refit will be completed in the normal time.
- 4. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew upon the completion of a well conducted and arduous patrol which was unfortunately devoid of enemy contacts.

JESSE L. HULL.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

18 July 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to: USS CAIMAN Conf. Ltr. A16-3 Serial 024, dated 27 June 1945. Report of Third War Patrol.

From:

The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.

To:

The Commander in Chief. UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via:

The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:

U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323) - Report of Third War

Patrol - Comment on.

- The Third War Patrol of the CAIMAN, under the 1. command of Lieutenant Commander W. L. FEY, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA and JAVA SEAS, and consisted of two phases separated by a re-fueling stop in SUBIC BAY on 31 May.
- During the First Plase of the patrol CAIMAN maintained a close-in search for traffic on the coast of INDO-CHINA from SAIGON to CAPE VARELLA. During the Second Phase of the patrol CARAN made a careful search for enemy traffic in the SOUTH CHINA SEA East of SINGAPORE and in the JAVA SEA South of BORNEO. Although area coverage was very thorough, no contacts worthy of torpedo fire were encountered. Two schooners were sunk by gunfire after inspection indicated that their cargo carrying capacities warranted their destruction. Lifeguard services were performed upon numerous occasions but no rescues were made.
- The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is not authorized for this patrol.
- The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the CAIMAN upon the completion of this long and arduous patrol. The CAIMAN is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

#### SUNK

2 - Schooners by gunfire

100 Tons

JAMES FIFE.
ORIGINAL COPY. 8 03965

ll/dn

Serial 0247-A C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

18 July 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS CAIMAN Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 024, dated 27 June
1945. Report of Third War
Patrol.

Subject:


U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323) - Report of Third War Patrol - Comment on.

#### Distribution

Cominch	(3) Direct	CTG-71.8	(2)	
Vice Opnav	(2) Direct	ComSubRon-22	(2)	
Vice Opnav Op-23c	(1)	ComSubRon-26	(2)	
ComlstFlt	(1)	ComSubRon-30	(2)	
Com2ndFlt	(1)	DivComSubRon-22	$(1 \epsilon$	ea)
Com7thFlt	(2)	DivComSubRon-26	$(1 \epsilon$	ea)
ComSubslstFlt	(30)	DivComsSubRon-30	$(1 \epsilon$	ea)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)	S/M School, N.L., Conn.	(2)	
CTF-71	(7)	Comdr. NYD, Puget Sound	(1)	
CTG-71.5	(2)	Subad, Mare Island	(2)	
		S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)	


THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

J. B. MILLER, Flag Secretary.



ETETS

### UNITED STATES FLEET COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET



A16-3(8)(F-3c/gtc)

Serial: 05612

17 AUG 1945

## C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to: CO USS CAIMAN conf ltr A16-3, serial 024, dated 27 June 1945.

From:

Commander Seventh Fleet.

To:

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:

U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323) - Report of Third

War Patrol - comment on.

1.

Forwarded.

RX MAS.

J. H. LONG By direction

Copy to:
ComSubs7th
ComSubRon-30
CO USS CAIMAN (SS323)

1945 AUG 28 11 27

O S. FLEET
REGEIVED